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YOUR PLACE OR MINE?: THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
COLLECTIBILITY OF AN UNDERLYING JUDGMENT IN A 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION 
MICHAEL P. CROSS, ESQ. 




While burdens of proof at trial do not necessarily equate to the 
awkwardness of a come-on during a date, the question “your place or 
mine” is still relevant to both, at least in Colorado. This article examines 
the seemingly unanswered question lingering in Colorado law as to 
whether a legal malpractice plaintiff bears the burden of proving collect-
ibility of an underlying judgment in order to establish a prima facie case 
or whether a defendant bears the burden of proving collectability as an 
affirmative defense. Is it your place to prove it or mine? 
Legal malpractice actions are unique in that they require a plaintiff 
to prove a case within a case. Namely, a plaintiff must first prove that he 
had a meritorious claim against a third party in the underlying action. 
Then, a plaintiff must prove that he would have been successful in that 
underlying action but for the lawyer’s negligence. The illusive concept of 
“success” has led to some confusion regarding burdens of proof in a 
malpractice action. Does a plaintiff have the burden simply to prove the 
likelihood of receiving a favorable judgment, while leaving collectibility 
as an affirmative defense for the defendant lawyer? Or does a plaintiff 
also have to prove the judgment was collectible in order to establish the 
elements of a legal malpractice claim? This question, though addressed 
by Colorado courts, still seems to be unanswered for purposes of creating 
a hard-and-fast, precedential ruling. If looking to jurisdictions outside of 
Colorado for guidance, lawyers will find they are split on the issue of 
which party bears the burden of proving collectibility. 
This article first reviews the current state of Colorado law with re-
gard to which party bears the burden of proving collectibility in a mal-
practice action. The article then goes beyond Colorado borders to explore 
how other jurisdictions have decided the issue and the factors those ju-
risdictions considered in rendering judicial opinions. 
  
 † Michael Cross and Nicole Quintana are attorneys with the law firm of Ogborn Mihm, LLP 
in Denver, Colorado, a firm focusing primarily on legal malpractice, commercial, construction, and 
personal injury litigation. 
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COLLECTIBILITY IN COLORADO 
The elements of a legal malpractice claim in the State of Colorado 
are well established. “To succeed on a legal malpractice claim founded in 
negligence, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the attorney owed a duty 
of care to the plaintiff; (2) the attorney breached that duty; and (3) the 
attorney’s breach proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.”
1
 Estab-
lishing proximate cause requires two elements: “First, the plaintiff must 
establish that but for the attorney’s actions, the injury would not have 
occurred. Second, the plaintiff must establish the ‘case within a case,’ 
which requires proof that the claim underlying the malpractice action 




The question is unclear in the State of Colorado as to whether the 
burden to prove that the underlying claim would have been “successful” 
includes the requirement to prove that any judgment that should have 
been awarded would have been collectible. The Supreme Court first 
faced this issue in Lawson v. Sigfrid, when a plaintiff brought a legal 
malpractice action against her attorney after the court dismissed a collec-
tion action for failure to prosecute.
3
 At trial, the defendant attorney ar-
gued, inter alia, that the defendant in the underlying action was insol-
vent, and therefore, plaintiff could not have suffered damage.
4
 The trial 
court agreed and directed verdict in favor of the defendant lawyer.
5
 On 
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the burden was on the defendant to show 
insolvency in the action below.
6
 The court did not disagree, but instead 
found that the plaintiff’s own evidence established insolvency, and there-
fore, there was no need to decide on which party the burden should be 
imposed.
7
 As a result, the Lawson decision established the relevancy of 
the question of whether an underlying judgment is collectible in a legal 
malpractice action, but “did not resolve the question of which party has 
the burden of proving the lack of assets.”
8
 
Since the Lawson decision, no published opinion in the State of 
Colorado has answered this question, though a couple have come close. 
For instance, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Morris v. Greer held that, 
as part of plaintiff’s burden to prove causation and damages, she had to 
  
 1. Brown v. Silvern, 45 P.3d 749, 751 (Colo. App. 2001) (citing Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox 
& O’Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78 (Colo. 1999)); see also Giron v. Koktavy, 124 P.3d 821, 824 (Colo. 
App. 2005); Luttgen v. Fischer, 107 P.3d 1152, 1154 (Colo. App. 2005); Fleming v. Lentz, Evans & 
King, P.C., 873 P.2d 38, 40 (Colo. App. 1994).  
 2. Brown, 45 P.3d at 751 (internal citations omitted). 
 3. 262 P. 1018, 1019 (Colo. 1927).  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Giron v. Koktavy, No. 01CV6001, 2007 WL 5210181, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2007). 
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prove the amount she would have “received.”
9
 In Morris, the plaintiff 
asserted claims against the attorney defendant for, inter alia, failing to 
prosecute a motion to set aside a divorce decree due to fraud on the part 
of the husband. The court stated: “As to her second claim, she was re-
quired to prove that because of husband’s fraud her motion to reopen the 
dissolution decree could have been successfully prosecuted, and that she 
would have received a higher property distribution as a result.”
10
 The 
court did not specify whether received meant receiving an award of a 
higher property distribution or actual receipt of the assets.
11
 This context 
is also unique in that providing proof of the husband’s assets would have 




Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Miller v. Byrne suggested in dicta 
that the legal malpractice plaintiff must prove as part of her case in chief 
the amount that would have been “recovered” but for the attorney’s neg-
ligence.
13
 In Miller, the plaintiffs asserted that the attorney defendants 
negligently defended a claim against them by failing to settle the matter. 
The court stated: “[The plaintiffs] were required to prove not only that 
there should have been a settlement of the wrongful death claim, but also 
that the passenger’s widow should have won the underlying case, and the 
amount that she should have recovered.”
14
 Again, the Court of Appeals 
does not specify whether the amount recovered referred to the amount of 
a jury verdict or the amount of that verdict that could be collected, nor 
was this issue necessary for its holding.
15
 
Two recent cases have directly invited the Court of Appeals to rule 
on this issue. In Giron v. Koktavy, the district court awarded summary 
judgment to the attorney defendant finding that the underlying judgment 
would have been uncollectible, relying on the decisions of Lawson and 
Morris.
16
 The district court held:  
While Lawson did not resolve the question of which party has the 
burden of proving the lack of assets. [sic] Under the facts of the in-
stant case, that burden is irrelevant, since Defendants have brought 
forward sufficient evidence, left unanswered by Plaintiff, that [the 
  
 9. 720 P.2d 994, 998 (Colo. App. 1986). 
 10. Id. (citing Lawson, 262 P. 1018); see also Coon v. Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Colo. 
App. 1973); Rosebud Mining & Milling Co. v. Hughes, 121 P. 674, 674 (Colo. App. 1912). Neither 
Coon nor Hughes address the issue of the burden to prove collectibility. 
 11. Morris, 720 P.2d at 998. 
 12. Id.  
 13. 916 P.2d 566, 579 (Colo. App. 1995).  
 14. Id.   
 15. Id.  
 16. No. 07CA0766, 2007 WL 5210181, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2007).  
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals went further, holding: “[W]e con-
clude that, under controlling Colorado precedent, proving collectibility is 
part of the plaintiff’s burden to prove actual damages proximately caused 
by the attorney’s malpractice.”
18
 The controlling precedent to which the 
Court of Appeals cites includes Lawson, Morris, Miller, and Coon, and 
the opinion provides no analysis beyond that discussed above.
19
 The 
Court of Appeals did not select this opinion for official publication, pro-
hibiting practitioners from citing this case as precedent.
20
 
Similarly in C&C Excavating, Inc. v. Whaley, the legal malpractice 
plaintiffs specifically argued that collectibility is an affirmative defense 
that must be pleaded and proven by the attorney defendant.
21
 The Court 
of Appeals simply held that the legal malpractice plaintiff’s burden in-
cluded “proof of lost recovery” and declined to review the issue of col-
lectibility.
22
 Again, the Court of Appeals chose not to select the opinion 
for official publication, and therefore, it does not constitute official prec-
edent in the State of Colorado.
23
 
Accordingly, at this time, the question is officially unanswered as to 
whether a Colorado legal malpractice plaintiff is required to prove in his 
case in chief that the underlying judgment he would have been awarded 
but for the malpractice of the defendant attorney would have been col-
lectible. One commentator suggests otherwise, stating: “In Colorado, 
after the client demonstrates that he would have prevailed on the under-
lying claim, he must also show that he could have collected the judg-
ment.”
24
 However, the only authority to which the commentator cites is 
Lawson.
25
 Even so, the commentator questions the current state of the 
law: “Applicability of this 60-year-old [now 85-year-old] rule is suspect, 
especially when the defendant attorney is charged with negligence in his 
handling of a claim against an insolvent party. This defense is an admis-
sion that the underlying case should never have been brought by the de-
  
 17. Id. at *3.  
 18. Giron v. Koktavy, No. 07CA0766, slip. op. at 4 (Colo. App. June 12, 2008).. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.; COLO. APP. R. 35(f) (“Those opinions designated for official publication shall be 
followed as precedent by the trial judges of the State of Colorado.”). Citation of unpublished opin-
ions is explicitly prohibited by the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals Forms and Policies, COLO. 
JUDICIAL. BRANCH, www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_Of_Appeals/Forms_Policies.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
 21. C&C Excavating, Inc. v. Whaley, No. 11CA0094, slip. op. at 3 (Colo. App. May 3, 2012). 
 22. Id. at 9–10.  
 23. See supra note 22.  
 24. 7 JOHN W. GRUND ET AL., COLORADO PRACTICE SERIES: PERSONAL INJURY TORTS AND 
INSURANCE, § 22:22 (3d ed. 2013).  
 25. Id.  
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fendant lawyer.”
26
  Regardless, the issue appears ripe for a published 
opinion.   
COLLECTIBILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
While Colorado law on this issue seems to lack precedential value 
at best or be undecided at worst, a majority of other jurisdictions around 
the country have more clearly defined burdens. However, a division ex-
ists among these other jurisdictions as to whether collectibility of an un-
derlying judgment is part of the legal malpractice plaintiff’s burden of 




The majority of jurisdictions place the burden on a malpractice 
plaintiff to prove collectibility in the underlying action. The opinions of 
these courts substantially rely on the argument that collectibility is a part 
of proving proximate cause and damage.
28
 “The injury proximately re-
sulting from defendants' negligence is the loss of a collectible judg-
ment.”
29
 As one court put it, “[i]n proving what was lost, the plaintiff 
must show what would have been gained [but for the lawyer’s negligent 
act].”
30
 If a plaintiff never could have collected a judgment from a third 
  
 26. Id.  
 27. The following eleven jurisdictions impose the burden of proving collectibility on the 
defendant: Alaska (Power Constructors v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 45 (Alaska 1998)); D.C. 
Circuit (Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1994)); Indiana (Clary v. Lite Machs. Corp., 850 
N.E.2d 423, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)); Louisiana (Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 
So.2d 1109, 1110 (La. 1982)); Maine (Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1987)); Mich-
igan (Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993)); New Hampshire (Carbone v. Tierney, 864 A.2d 308, 318 (N.H. 2004)); New Jersey (Hoppe 
v. Ranzini, 385 A.2d 913, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (establishing that fairness requires 
the burden of proof with respect to the issue of collectibility to be on the attorney defendant, “not-
withstanding the rule elsewhere that places that burden on plaintiff”); Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 
935 A.2d 1236, 1249 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)); New York (Lindenman v, Kreitzer, 775 
N.Y.S.2d. 4, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (split of opinion among New York appellate divisions)); 
Oregon (Ridenour v. Lewis, 854 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)); and Pennsylvania (Kituskie 
v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027, 1032 (Pa. 1998)).  
 
The following seventeen jurisdictions impose the burden on the legal malpractice plaintiff: Califor-
nia (Hecht, Solber, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446, 454 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2006)); Connecticut (Palmieri v. Winnick, 482 A.2d 1229, 1229 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984)); 
Florida (Fernandes v. Barrs, 641 So.2d 1371, 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); Georgia (McDow v. 
Dixon, 226 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)); Illinois (Visvardis v. Ferleger, 873 N.E.2d 436, 
443 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)); Iowa (Burke v. Roberson, 417 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 1987)); Massachu-
setts (Jernigan v, Giard, 500 N.E.2d 806, 807 (Mass. 1986)); Minnesota (Christy v. Saliterman, 179 
N.W.2d 288, 306 (Minn. 1970)); Nebraska (Eno v. Watkins, 429 N.W.2d 371, 372 (Neb. 1988)); 
New Mexico (Carrillo v. Coors, 901 P.2d 214, 217 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)); New York (McKenna v. 
Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (split of opinion among New 
York appellate divisions)); North Carolina (Rorrer v. Cooke, 329 S.E.2d 355, 361 (N.C. 1985)); 
Ohio (Paterek v. Petersen & Ibold, 890 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ohio 2008)); South Dakota (Taylor Oil Co. 
v. Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27, 30 (S.D. 1983)); Tennessee (Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63, 67 
(E.D. Tenn. 1966)); Texas (Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1989)); and Washing-
ton (Lavigne v. Chase, Haskell, Hayes & Kalamoon, P.S., 50 P.3d 306, 311 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 28. See supra note 29.  
 29. McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
 30. Paterek, 890 N.E.2d at 321. 
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party, then a defendant attorney’s negligence logically could not have 
caused damage to that plaintiff because the negligent act did not put the 
plaintiff in any better or worse position.
31
 Injury must be measured by 
what a plaintiff actually would have collected in recompense.
32
 The re-
quirement to prove collectibility in order to establish a prima facie case 
ensures a plaintiff does not receive a windfall from the lawyer.
33
  
Conversely, a slightly lesser number of jurisdictions consider col-
lectibility to be an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant 
lawyer, and those jurisdictions offer a number of reasons for doing so.
34
 
Many jury instructions containing the elements of a malpractice action 
contain no explicit language regarding proof of collectibility, arguably 
establishing the issue as one of an affirmative defense. Aside from the 
lack of specific elements addressing collectibility, this minority of juris-
dictions focus more on ideas of fairness.
35
 Some courts rely on the ra-
tionale that plaintiff was already allegedly wronged twice—first by a 
third party and next by the attorney. Therefore, a plaintiff should not 
sustain the added burden of proving collectibility in the malpractice ac-
tion.
36
 Similar to this second justification, other courts recognize that the 
issue of collectibility arises only as a result of professional negligence, 
and the requirement to actually prove collectibility arises only after a 
plaintiff proves malpractice. Therefore, fairness militates in favor of re-
quiring the malpracticing attorney to bear the inherent risks and uncer-
tainties of proving uncollectibility.
37
 
It is often difficult to prove collectibility, and that difficulty may 
arise as a result of the negligence of the defendant attorney.
38
 For in-
stance, one court noted that a problem may arise as to the date of the 
determination of collectibility because a defendant’s solvency may de-
pend entirely on the date the underlying judgment would have been re-
ceived, which may be difficult to recreate due to the attorney defendant’s 
  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Lavigne, 50 P.3d at 310 (stating that “[h]ypothetical damages beyond what the plaintiff 
would have genuinely collected from the judgment creditor ‘are not a legitimate portion of her 
‘actual injury;’ awarding her those damages would result in a windfall’”) (quoting Klump v. Duffus, 
71 F.3d 1368, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 34. See supra note 29. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 37. Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31 (Alaska 1998). 
 38. Id. (“Because the need to determine collectibility . . . arises only after malpractice has 
been proved, policy would seem to militate in favor of requiring the malpracticing attorney to bear 
the inherent risks and uncertainties of proving uncollectibility.”); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 385 A.2d 913, 
920 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (“We have concluded that fairness requires that the burden of 
proof with respect to issue of collectibility should be on the attorney defendants . . . .”); Winter v. 
Brown, 365 A.2d 381, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding that the actual loss to the plaintiff was “not 
subject to fair measurement or calculation,” and that lawyer defendants “must bear the onus of their 
error and the resultant impossibility of ascertaining the value of what was lost”);  see also Clary v. 
Lite Machs. Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423, 439 (Ind. Ct. App.).  
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negligence.
39
 Additionally, legal malpractice cases are often brought 
years after the underlying events due to the attorney defendant’s negli-
gent delay.
40
 Therefore, courts have forced the attorney defendant to bear 
the difficulties of proof caused by this delay.
41
 
Courts imposing the burden on a defendant to prove collectibility of 
the underlying judgment have also focused on the concept of the value of 
that judgment, even if that judgment is not collectible at the time re-
ceived. For instance, courts have noted that a judgment may have value 
as an assignable property interest.
42
 Additionally, judgments are valid for 
a substantial length of time, and therefore, a judgment which is not col-
lectible at the time of its award may become collectible in the future.
43
 
Courts have focused on the possibility that the underlying case might 
have settled.
44
 Finally, one court recognized that the award of a judgment 
has value, regardless of whether it is collectible, as vindication of the 
legitimacy of the underlying claim.
45
 Arguably, a judgment or right to a 
  
 39. Hoppe, 385 A.2d at 919 (“[A] problem arises as to the date as of which [the matter of 
collectibility] should be determined.”).  
 40. Smith v. Haden, 868 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994) (“[P]lacing the burden on a plaintiff to 
prove collectibility would be unfairly burdensome, particularly when a legal malpractice suit is often 
brought years after the underlying events and when the delay by the plaintiff in bringing such a suit 
is because of the defendant-lawyer’s failure to act in a timely manner in the first place.”); Kituskie v. 
Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Pa. 1998) (“To require the plaintiff to also prove collectibility of 
damages would result in placing an unfair burden on the plaintiff where the plaintiff’s legal malprac-
tice action is often brought years after the initial [negligence] causing his injuries solely because the 
defendant/lawyer failed to act in a timely and competent manner.”); Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Ins. Co., 422 So.2d 1109, n.2 (La. 1982) (“The client’s problem is frequently compounded when 
the attorney’s negligence and the lapse of time has left a new attorney to search for stale evidence 
and has prevented or severely hampered thorough and effective preparation of the claim for trial.”); 
see also Carbone v. Tierney, 864 A.2d 308, 318 (N.H. 2004). 
 41. See supra note 42. 
 42. See Ridenour v. Lewis, 854 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (“A judgment may have 
value because it is collectible from the judgment debtor’s assets or prospective assets, or because the 
judgment debtor’s insurance partly or wholly covers the claim. A judgment may also have market 
value as an assignable property interest.”).  
 43. Lindenman v. Kreitzer, 775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9 (N.Y. App. Div.) (“[C]onsideration must be 
given to the fact that a New York judgment has a 20-year life span and that, even if the judgment is 
not collectible at the time of its entry, it may become collectible at any time during that life span.”) 
(internal citations omitted); Power Constructors, 960 P.2d at 31 (“[T]here is no good reason to 
presume from a record silent on the issue of collectibility that the underlying judgment at issue 
would not eventually be collected.”); Hoppe, 385 A.2d at 919 (“It is not without significance that 
had a judgment been obtained against DePoe, it would have been valid for 20 years, and, in an 
appropriate proceeding, might have been extended for another 20 years.”). Similarly in Colorado, a 
district court judgment is valid for twenty years and its life may be extended for successive twenty-
year periods. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-52-102 (2013).  
 44. Smith, 868 F. Supp. at 2 (requiring the plaintiff to show the degree of collectibility of a 
judgment in a legal malpractice case “wholly ignores the possibility of a settlement between the 
plaintiff and the potential defendant, either before or after judgment, which may be encouraged by 
active litigation of a claim”); Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1032 (imposing the burden to prove collectibility 
on the legal malpractice plaintiff “ignores the possibility of settlement between the plaintiff and the 
underlying [defendant] and also overlooks that the passage of time itself can be a militating factor 
either for or against collectibility of the underlying case”); see also Clary v. Lite Machs. Corp., 850 
N.E.2d 423, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  
 45. Lindenman, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (“[A] fact finder’s judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, i.e., the 
finding that the plaintiff was wronged by the defendant in the underlying action and wronged by the 
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judgment in the underlying case may have greater psychological value 
for some plaintiffs above and beyond the monetary value. These justifi-
cations mirror the concept of “success” that has not officially been an-
swered by Colorado courts. 
CONCLUSION 
While these jurisdictions are divided on the issue of the bearer of 
the burden to prove collectibility of an underlying judgment, their courts 
have directly confronted the issue and provided unequivocal guidance to 
litigants in their respective jurisdictions. On the contrary, the Colorado 
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since the Lawson decision in 
1927, and the Court of Appeals has declined recent opportunities to pro-
vide a published opinion. In spite of the lack of precedential case guid-
ance, Colorado practitioners are best served by assuming their respective 




attorney who represented him in that action, is itself a vindication of the legitimacy of the plaintiff’s 
underlying claim and has value regardless of whether it is wholly collectible.”). 
